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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the determination of Congress."'1 6 But in either event, since it is a competi-
tion problem which is sought to be remedied, any restrictions which might be
placed upon labor practices should be limited to those which tend to affect
the product market-not the labor market. In this connection, the issue of
whether such activities involve valid union objectives is of vital importance.
When Senator McClellan presented his antitrust proposal'37 to Congress,
he stated:
I hope -that public hearings on this measure will be held early in the next session of
the Congress [87th Cong., 2d Sess.] and that all interests will be given an opportunity
to be heard. 138
It might be well to add, with respect to this bill or any other proposal,
antitrust or labor, that the Senator's wish, that all be heard, should only be
granted upon the stipulation that the cliches, "pro-labor" and "anti-labor,"
"pro-management" and "anti-management," be abandoned. 13 9 In the past
such phrases have constituted major stumbling blocks in the discussion of
much needed legislation. The present situation is a serious one. Political im-
plications must be kept to a minimum; 1 40 the public interest demands that a
more fruitful level of thought obtain.
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE IN NEW YORK FOR FRAUD
BASED UPON RELIGIOUS FACTORS
Since the only ground for divorce in New York is adultery,' it is not surpris-
ing that the courts of New York have been the forum for an unusually large
number of suits for annulment. Of the grounds provided by statute for annul-
ment of marriage,2 fraud is the most commonly used. It has been aptly
136. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. at 810.
137. S. 2573, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
138. 107 Cong. Rec. at 18946.
139. E.g., for a rather critical view of Senator's McClellan's bill see Int'l Teamster,
March 1962, p. 17.
140. In this connection, it might be well to note the words of Senator McClellan:
"I am not unmindful of the political risks one takes when he insists that we should have
a rule of law and not a rule of economic force .... [W]hat I am doing is not popular
politically . . . ." 107 Cong. Rec. at 18946.
1. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1147.
2. Voidable: non-age, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 7(1), N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1133; want
of understanding, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 7(2); idiocy, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1136; lunacy,
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1137; physical incapacity, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 7(3), N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Act § 1141; force or duress, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 7(4), N.Y. Civ. Prae. Act § 1139;
fraud, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 7(4), N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1139; five years' incurable In-
sanity, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 7(5).
Void: incest, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 5; former spouse living, N.Y. Dom. Rol. Law § 6;
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1134.
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described as "New York's answer to Reno." 3 One of the essentials of a mar-
riage is that it must be contracted with the consent of the parties thereto; 4
such consent is lacking where a party consents to the marriage by reason of
fraud. 5 Section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law" provides that under such
circumstances the marriage is void from the time its nullity is declared by a
court of competent jurisdiction. Since the statutes do not explicitly say what
fraud is, the courts are free to meet each case as it arises and to judge the
defendant's conduct by the test of fair and conscientious dealing.7
The fraudulent misrepresentation must be of a material fact,3 so that if it
had not been practiced the party who was deceived would not have consented
to the marriage 2 The plaintiff must also show that the party deceived had the
right to rely upon such representation, in the sense that it was such as
would have influenced an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person into giving
his consent to the marriage.' 0 Although there is some authority which states
A marriage may be "dissolved" if a spouse is absent for five years and believed to be
dead. N.Y. Dom. Rd. Law § 7-a. A marriage automatically "terminates" on the sentence
of either party to life imprisonment. In re Lindewall, 237 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E.2d 907 (1942);
Wilder v. Milder, 181 Al1c. 1059, 43 N.YS.2d 2387 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Bond v. Bond, 162
Mlisc. 449, 295 N.Y. Supp. 24 (Sup. Ct. 1937). See also N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 6(2).
3. Comment, 4S Colum. L. Rev. 900 (1943).
4. Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 134 N.E. 60 (1933). N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10
provides: "AMarriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, continues to be a civil con-
tract, to which the consent of parties capable in law of makdng a contract is ezential."
Marriage is regulated and controlled by law based on principles of public policy affecting
the welfare of the people of the state, the state as well as the parties being a party to
every marriage. Reese v. Reese, 179 Mlisc. 665, 40 N.Y.S.2d 46S (Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 263 App.
Div. 993, 51 N.Y.S.2d 6W5 (2d Dep't 1943). "This statute declares it [marriage] a civil
contract, as distinguished from a religious sacrament, and makes the element of consent
necessary to its legal validity. . . . It is declared a civil contract for certain purposes, but
it is not thereby made synonymous with the word contract employed in the common law
or statutes. ... It cannot be dissolved by the parties ...nor released with or without
consideration. The relation is always regulated by government. ... It partakes more of
the character of an institution regulated and controlled by public authority, upon prin-
ciples of public policy, for the benefit of the community." Wade v. Kalbfleicb, S N.Y.
282, 284, 17 Am. Rep. 250, 252 (1374).
5. Wraff v. Waft, 189 Misc. 372, 71 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
6. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 7(4).
7. Waff v. Waft, 139 MLsc. 372, 374, 71 N.Y.S.2d 775, 777 (Sup. CL 1947). See also
Longtin v. Longtin, 22 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
S. Roger v. Roger, 24 Mlisc. 2d 566, 203 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. CL 1960).
9. Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. at 431, 134 N.E. at 61; Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo,
174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903); Watkins v. Watkins, 197 App. Div. 489, IS9 N.Y. Supp.
860 (1st Dep't 1921); Girshick v. Girshick, 44 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Griffin v.
Griffin, 122 Alisc. 337, 204 N.Y. Supp. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
10. Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903); Marks v. Mfarks, 233
App. Div. 1136, 131 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. CL 1954); Croce v. Croce, 199 Alisc. 635, 100
N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1950); PawowAd v. Pawlows.ki, 65 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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that the plaintiff must prove that the fraud goes to the essentials of the marriage
contract"-that is, the rights and obligations connected with cohabitation and
consortium attached by law to the marital status,12-it is more widely accepted
that the misrepresentation need not necessarily concern these essentialia. Rather
it must relate to matters which have a direct and vital bearing upon the
marital happiness and health of the one who was misled.18
In cases where the alleged fraud relates to a party's religious beliefs or
religious practices a serious dilemma must be resolved. As one court has
stated, "The right of the individual to his religious conviction is so ingrained
in our philosophy of government and life that courts hesitate not to give full
credence to such a claim."' 4 Yet, it is also true that courts are composed of
practical men who are obliged by experience to recognize that, like many of
our freedoms, religion can be used by the unscrupulous "as a convenient cloak
to conceal many faults."' 5
FRAUDULENT PRoMISE To EMBRACE FAITH OF SPOUSE
Actions for annulment in New York based upon a fraudulent promise to
convert to the religious faith of the spouse have, over the years, grown in
number. Taylor v. Taylor 6 was the first reported case brought on this ground.
The decision was quite obviously dictated by the extreme facts of the case.
The couple had five children; they had been married for thirteen years, and
the wife was apparently motivated to bring the action by reason of her hus-
band's imprisonment. In refusing to grant the annulment the court was careful
to point out that "the allegation is a material one. To one truly religious and
a devout communicant of a religious faith, it would be a matter of transcending
importance, overshadowing any material considerations. If such an allegation
can be supported by proof . . . she is entitled to an annulment of the mar-
riage."'17 The Taylor reasoning was accepted and the same conclusion followed
in later cases,' 8 the court in each instance finding insufficient credible evidence
11. Di Piro v. Di Pillo, 17 Misc. 2d 673, 184 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See also
Musso v. Musso, 143 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Smith v. Smith, 44 N.Y.S.2d 826
(Sup. Ct. 1943).
12. See Woronzoff-Daschkoff v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff, 303 N.Y. 506, 511, 104 N.E.2d
877, 880 (1952); Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 60 (1933); DI Lorenzo v.
Di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903).
13. Woronzoff-Daschkoff v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff, 303 N.Y. 506, 104 N.E.2d 877 (1952);
Lapides v. Lapides, 254 N.Y. 73, 80, 171 N.E. 911, 913 (1930); Marks v. Marks, 283 App.
Div. 1136, 131 N.Y.S.2d 513 (3d Dep't 1954); Roger v. Roger, 124 Misc. 2d 566, 203
N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Hochman v. Hochman, 68 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
14. Vonbiroganis (Von Brack) v. Von Brack, 64 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
15. Ibid.
16. 181 Misc. 306, 47 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
17. Id. at 306-07, 47 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
18. Dodge v. Dodge, 64 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Kubistal v. Kubstal, 116
N.Y.L.J. 110 (Sup. Ct. July 18, 1946).
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to support the wife's allegation that her husband did in fact promise to embrace
her religion after marriage.
A more hostile appraisal of the materiality of misrepresentations pertahining
to a party's religion was made in Nilsen v. Nilsen.0 There the court said that
"a false representation to fulfill a contract, which contract violates the public
policy of this State, should not be a ground for an action to annul a marriage
for fraud. 2 0 It doubted whether the consent of a reasonably prudent person
would have depended upon a promise to embrace a different religion. The
court stated:
To a reasonably prudent person, embracing a particular religion is not a matter of
signing a book and paying dues. It involves some understanding and some acceptance
of religious beliefs, moral law and forms of worship. People do not acquire these as
they do a suit of clothes. People in good faith may attempt to adopt a particular
religion and never succeed.21
In dismissing the complaint, the court warned that recognition of the alleged
fraud "eventually would require the civil courts to undertake to solve problems
and to answer questions which are outside the civil aspects of marriage and
should be left with the parties and their respective religious affiliations for
possible solution."2''
Later cases have ignored the Nilsen warning. In Williams v. Wflliams it
appeared that the plaintiff, a Roman Catholic, had first declined the defendant's
proposal of marriage because he was not a Catholic; that defendant represented
to plaintiff that he would convert to Catholicism and live and practice that
faith; that the parties were married only after the defendant had obtained
instructions from a priest; and that for a short time defendant ostensibly com-
plied with the practice of the Catholic faith, but then declined to go to church
and stated that he never did believe the teachings of the Catholic Church and
that his promise to do so was made solely for the purpose of inducing the
plaintiff to marry him. Upon learning these facts the plaintiff ceased marital
relations with the defendant. In granting the annulment, the court noted that
the plaintiff had demanded not merely an outward compliance with the form of
conversion, but the actual living in the marital status in accordance with her
faith.24 It said:
For the plaintiff to live with the defendant as his wife would be repugnant in every
aspect of their lives together. By his acts and promises he grossly deceived her and
induced her to enter a marriage based upon representations that were cruel in their
falsity.... The fraud ... which was to him but an empty gesture but to the plain-
19. 66 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
20. Id. at 206.
21. Id. at 207.
22. Ibid.
23. 194 1lLsc. 201, S6 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
24. Id. at 202, 86 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
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tiff a thing of tragic implications, is so serious that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
which she seeks.2 5
Since the Williams decision, the cases have taken for granted the materiality
of the fraud.2 6 The problem now is one of proof. Thus in Howardell v.
Howardell,27 the court had to determine whether the defendant actually
practiced a fraud in promising to convert or whether the promise, made in good
faith, was not fulfilled because of sincere religious doubts. There it was found
that the wife had been induced to enter a civil marriage in reliance upon the
defendant's promise to become a Catholic and to have the marriage solemnized
in the Catholic Church. After the civil ceremony, the defendant went to the
rectory once and refused to become a Catholic. The court held that "one visit,
and no more, plainly indicated a superficiality and captiousness that does not
merit credence or serious treatment ...,,28 and therefore granted the annul-
ment. It intimated, however, that the annulment would have been refused
"if the defendant had undergone a course of instructions and then did not go
forward because of spiritual scruples, or doubts, or hesitations of the mind. ".
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE FOR FRAUDULENT REFUSAL To
PERFORM RELIGIOUS CEREMONY
A party who consents to enter marriage on condition that the civil ceremony
will be followed by a religious ceremony may have a cause of action for annul-
ment if after the civil ceremony the other party refuses to perform the religious
ceremony.30 The person seeking annulment must establish that the promise
25. Id. at 202-03, 86 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
26. Howardell v. Howardell, 1 Misc. 2d 941, 151 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Villani
v. Villani, 207 Misc. 629, 139 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Sadler v. Sadler, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 21, 1961, p. 16, col. 5M (Sup. Ct.).
27. 1 Misc. 2d 941, 151 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
28. Id. at 942, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
29. Ibid.
30. See, e.g., Aufiero v. Aufiero, 222 App. Div. 479, 226 N.Y. Supp. 611 (1st Dep't
1928); Rutstein v. Rutstein, 221 App. Div. 70, 222 N.Y. Supp. 688 (1st Dep't 1927); Wat-
kins v. Watkins, 197 App. Div. 489, 189 N.Y. Supp. 860 (1st Dep't 1921). Mirizio v.
Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74, 150 N.E. 605 (1926), may at first glance appear contra, but It can
in fact easily be distinguished. The parties were married in a civil ceremony and had agreed
that they would not live together or consummate the marriage until performance of the
Catholic ceremony. Mrs. Mirizio refused to consummate the marriage because her husband
declined to go through with the promised ceremony and, as a result, they never lived
together. She then brought an action under N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1162 demanding a
separation with provision for support. The husband defended on the ground that his act
of not supporting her was justified by her refusal to discharge her marital obligations. The
court of appeals, Judge Lehman dissenting, dismissed the wife's complaint with strong
language: "[M]odifications of the marriage contract by private agreement would lead to
disruption of that contract and disaster in the attempt to enforce it." 242 N.Y. at 84, 150
N.E. at 609. There is, however, no incompatibility between the Mirizio holding and the
many cases before and after it which have granted annulments for a fraudulent promise to
supplement a civil marriage with a religious ceremony. Mrs. Mirizio's misfortune was that
she chose the wrong remedy, separation. Rutstein v. Rutstein, supra, an annulment action,
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respecting the religious ceremony was a vital element inducing consent to the
civil marriage.3'
The mere fact that a person says he is a Protestant or a Catholic or a Jew is in-
sufficient. But if he shows by competent evidence that he has a genuine affiliation
with the religion he professes and that a marriage in that religion was a primary
consideration, then a prenuptial promise may have some meaning.32
The plaintiff must further prove that, while the defendant ostensibly con-
sented to a religious ceremony, so as to mislead the plaintiff to do that which
otherwise would not have been done, there was present a silent determination
not to have a religious ceremony.33 Thus, in Anonymous v. Anonymous,' it
appeared that both parties at the time of the civil ceremony agreed not to
consummate the marriage until a rabbinical marriage had been performed.
Shortly thereafter, and while making arrangements for the Jewish ceremony,
the wife sustained an injury to the spinal cord which prevented a consum-
mation of the marriage. The husband brought an action for annulment, claim-
ing that the civil ceremony was not to be binding until the religious ceremony
was performed. The court held that, in the absence of fraud in the promise
of a religious ceremony, the civil ceremony is binding even without consumma-
tion. "There being no fraud in the inception of the marriage, the law recognizes
no privately imposed conditions that would alter the marital status"35 The
court went on to state that the marital status is "too much a matter of public
pointed out that Mlirizio was predicated upon an existing contract and v'as in furtherance
thereof. 221 App. Div. at 75-76, 222 N.Y. Supp. at 694. Thus the only proposition that can
validly be derived from Mlirizio is that by refusing to consummate the marriage the plain-
tiff was guilty of such misconduct as to bar her claim for separation and support while
the misconduct continued. Mirizio v. Mfirizo, 243 N.Y. 175, 161 N.E. 461 (1923). Accord,
Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206, 163 N.E.2d 654, 203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960).
31. Hubner v. Hubner, 64 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
32. Ibid. Numerous decrees of annulment have been denied because of the plaintiffs
failure to prove the crucial importance of the religious ceremony. See, e.g., Troid v. Traoi,
156 N.Y.S.2d 2S9 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Kurrus v. Kurrus, 136 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Sup. CL 1954);
Iten v. Iten, 64 N.YV.S.2d SS2 (Sup. CL 1946).
33. Watkins v. Watkins, 197 App. Div. 489, 1S9 N.Y. Supp. 860 (1st Dep't 1921).
There, an orthodox Jewish girl sought an annulment after the defendant refused to permit
the performance of the promised rabbinical marriage. The court granted the annulment,
stressing that the promise "was made by the defendant with the intent to deceive and de-
fraud the plaintiff and with the intent on his part not to carry out his promise. .. 11 Id.
at 490, 139 N.Y. Supp. at S61. The pertinent questions which the courts will conider in
determination of annulments of this character are: "Did defendant represent to plaintiff
that he would marry plaintiff in her church? Did defendant at the time not intend to kccp
such promise? Did plaintiff believe the representation to be true? Did the mizreprecnta-
tion induce the plaintiff to consent to the marriage? Did she rely on the promise?" Borg-
stedt v. Borgstedt, 64 N.Y.S.2d 8SS-S9 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd on rehearing, 1SS Mic. 183, 67
N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
34. 49 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
35. Id. at 316. See also Malachick v. falachick, 296 N.Y. 553, 63 N.E.2d 862 (1946)
(memorandum decision); Bentz v. Bentz, 18S AIisc. 86, 67 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. CL 1947).
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concern to allow the parties to tinker with it according to their own notions
of what is expedient or proper."36
Lorifice v. Lorifice37 applied this reasoning to a slightly varied set of facts.
There a civil marriage was performed in Italy but with the agreement that
there would be a Roman Catholic ceremony after the bride's immigration to
the United States. After her arrival in America, the parties, apparently experi-
encing a change of heart, refused to have the religious ceremony performed. An
annulment was refused because it was not shown that at the time of their civil
marriage either party had any fraudulent intent.
[T]he conduct of the defendant bars a finding, incumbent upon the plaintiff to
establish, that the defendant misrepresented a material fact made with the intention
to induce him to enter into the contract of civil marriage and without which the
plaintiff would not have done so. An intent to deceive at the time the promise was
made is essential.38
It is significant to note that the annulment was denied in Lorifice even though
both parties were recognized as apparently being devout Catholics, 9 to whom
a religious ceremony would be of great importance. The case, therefore, clearly
demonstrates that a fraudulent intent at the time of the promise is a sine qua
non to an annulment based on fraud.
UNFULFILLED PROMISES FOR A SECOND RELIGIOUS CEREMONY
Prospective spouses of different religious creeds sometimes agree that they
will have their marriage solemnized according to the rites of both faiths. In
no case has a New York court granted an annulment where there was already
one religious ceremony and the unfulfilled antenuptial promise was for a
second religious ceremony.40 In Hubner v. Hubner,41 the husband sought an
annulment on the ground that the wife promised to marry him in a Protestant
ceremony after they had been married in a Catholic ceremony, but refused to
go through with the Protestant rite. The court stated:
This case should be distinguished from those where the parties first marry before the
civil authority and contemplate a subsequent religious ceremony. No case has come
to the attention of the court granting an annulment for refusal to have a second
religious ceremony. 42
In Hubner, the parties lived together only a short time. No child was born
36. 49 N.Y.S.2d at 316. The fact that the husband claimed marital status in his income
tax returns and Navy allotments weakened his contention that neither party had con-
sidered the civil marriage binding.
37. 148 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
38. Id. at 582.
39. Id. at 579.
40. Borgstedt v. Borgstedt, 64 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd on rehearing, 188 Misc.
183, 67 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1946); Hubner v. Hubner, 64 N.Y.S.2d 513, aff'd, 188 Misc. 125, 67
N.Y.S.2d 70 (Sup. Ct. 1946). See also Samuelson v. Samuelson, 155 Md. 639, 142 At. 97
(1928). Compare Wells v. Talham, 180 Wis. 654, 194 N.W. 36 (1923).
41. 64 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
42. Id. at 513-14.
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of the marriage, and the plaintiff testified that the marriage had not been
consummated. The court, in a subsequent hearing S refused to distinguish
Borgstedt v. Borgstedt,44 where the marriage was consummated and there was
one child. There, it was alleged by the wife that the defendant fraudulently
refused to fulfill a promise to have an Episcopalian ceremony follow a Catholic
marriage rite. The court denied the annulment and stated:
The parties in effect claim that they made a private agreement that in the future
there would be a second ceremonial marriage. Logically, the plaintiff must claim that
this was of such importance to her that if the promise were not kept, she would not
consider herself married. The law does not recognize any such private agreement and
it is difficult to see how a prohibited agreement can be recognized as the basis of a
prenuptial fraud.
The court seems to indicate that once there has been one religious ceremony,
the beliefs of the parties have been sufficiently respected. Courts refuse to
cancel the effect of the first ceremony for lack of a second, because it is
reasoned, though not with compelling logic, that this would be equivalent
to a conclusion by the court that the first religions ceremony is not binding
until and unless ratified by the second, and therefore to a certain extent in-
ferior to that of the second church.40 Such a determination, according to
such reasoning, would be beyond the authority of the court, because it is
against public policy for a court to favor one religion over another. 7
In the case of a Roman Catholic seeking an annulment, the petition has
sometimes been dismissed in even stronger terms. Such a plaintiff is held to
the same religious principles which he asserts as the basis of relief. Thus
one court, turning the tables on the Catholic plaintiff, has said: "The plaintiff
sets up the standards by which her case is to be judgedY 4s In applying them
the court noted that "a practical Catholic would not consent to be married in
a religious ceremony outside her own church."-1 In McHale v. McHaler a
Catholic husband who was married to the defendant by a clergyman of another
faith sought an annulment because his wife refused to have a Catholic ceremony
performed. Here the court grounded its denial on a finding that the husband
was in fact defrauded of nothing since by marrying outside his church he
incurred automatic excommunication. rl Similarly, a marriage will not be an-
nulled on the ground of a fraudulent misrepresentation by the husband, prior
to the marriage, that he was a practicing Catholic, where the evidence showed
that the defrauded party had flouted the precepts of the Catholic Church by
43. Hubner v. Hubner, 1SS Mise. 125, 67 N.Y.S.2d 70 (Sup. CL 1946).
44. 64 N.Y.S.2d SSS (Sup. Ct.), aff'd on rehearing, ISS Misc. 183, 67 X.Y.S.2d C5 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
45. 1SS Alisc. at 137, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
46. Ibid.
47. Knibbs v. Knibbs, 94 N.J. Eq. 747, 121 Ad. 715 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923).
4S. Borgstedt v. Borgstedt, 64 N.Y.S.2d SSS, 3S9 (Sup. CL 1946).
49. Ibid.
50. 183 Misc. 165, 67 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
51. Ibid.
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marrying in a civil ceremony.52 Under the circumstances, these cases take
what appears to be the wisest approach. Contrary rulings quite logically would
undermine the cardinal rule that where fraud is alleged, its materiality must
be shown.
DUTY To CEASE COHABITATION
In addition to the matters of proof already discussed, a plaintiff seeking
annulment on religious grounds in New York must comply with Section 1139
of the Civil Practice Act. The section provides that "a marriage shall not
be annulled ... on the ground of fraud, if it appears that, at any time before
the commencement [of the action] . . . , the parties voluntarily cohabited as
husband and wife, with a full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud."
This, of course, places upon the party seeking an annulment the duty to
cease cohabitation upon discovery of the fraud.5 3
In most of the cases in which an annulment was granted for failure to go
through with a promised religious ceremony, the marriage was, when the plain-
tiff first became aware of the fraud, not consummated by cohabitation."4 There
is, however, some authority permitting the annulment to be granted despite
consummation, where the cohabitation was of short duration,55 or took place
by means of force,56 one court even suggesting that the reasonableness and
prudence of each individual's conduct should be the court's divining rod.5 7
But the general rule for all annulments based on fraud seems to be equally
52. Musso v. Musso, 143 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
53. Taylor v. Taylor, 181 Misc. 306, 47 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1943). See also Schul-
man v. Schulman, 257 App. Div. 1002, 13 N.Y.S.2d 611 (2d Dep't 1939); Russo v. Russo,
168 Misc. 551, 5 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
54. E.g., Brillis v. Brillis, 4 N.Y.2d 125, 149 N.E.2d 510, 173 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1958); Rut-
stein v. Rutstein, 221 App. Div. 70, 222 N.Y. Supp. 688 (1st Dep't 1927); Watkins v.
Watkins, 197 App. Div. 489, 189 N.Y. Supp. 860 (1st Dep't 1921).
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applicable to religious fraud: cohabitation with knowledge or reasonable ap-
prehension of the fraud waives the right to annulment.
Although the courts have only infrequently expressly stated so, it would
appear that the absence of consummation is a factor weighed heavily in favor
of a plaintiff seeking annulment because prior to cohabitation the state and
community have acquired no substantial interests. Where the marriage has
been consummated, and the community has long recognized the relation, the
relationship has ripened into a public status, possibly involving children, the
creation of debts, and real estate, and thus considerations of public policy
apply which do not apply, at least not to the same degree, in an unconsummated
marriage. In the latter case, since the marriage is little more than a paper
contract, a lesser degree of fraud would seem to be sufficient to annul it.CP
CONCLUSION
General dissatisfaction with a spouse may, in suits of this nature, be the
real motivation, rather than religious scruples. The courts should, therefore,
give greater heed to the admonition that "religion, like many of our freedoms,
can be used as a convenient cloak to conceal many faults." 0' In order to
discourage the unscrupulous from using alleged religious fraud as an easy means
of relieving themselves of their contractual obligations, courts should, as in
McHale,62 give full consideration to the attitude of the particular religion
toward the conduct of the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff is relying upon those
tenets as the basis of his relief, it would be unreasonable to grant the annul-
ment if his actions have been incompatible with the deep religious faith he
now alleges.63 With regard to the granting of annulments for failure to fulfill
a promise to embrace the spouse's religion, it would seem that the courts have
already gone too far. In the ordinary case, it is questionable whether a reason-
ably prudent person would or should seriously rely upon a promise of con-
version. It would seem that in the ordinary case if religious unity in the marital
state were truly a material factor to the plaintiff, then he would have insisted
that the arrangements for conversion be effectuated before marriage. In any
event, the courts should certainly follow the dicta in Howardcll" and deny an
annulment on this ground if the defendant refused to convert because of
spiritual scruples or doubts. To do otherwise would be an unfortunate and
obnoxious intrusion by the courts into matters which are only tangentially
within their purview.
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